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Using the literature on the political business cycle as a point of departure, this paper investigates whether 
incumbent politicians manipulate the enforcement of tax collection prior to elections, in order to win votes. 
Whereas previous literature has focused on macro level measurement, this paper turns the attention to the 
micro level, and introduces a novel measurement for the enforcement of tax regulations on an individual 
level. The paper investigates this question using 70 country-rounds of survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa 
combined with data on the timing of elections. There is no clear-cut evidence for such policy manipulations 
on an aggregate level, but findings indicate that this might differ depending on the incumbent’s level of 
political support. These findings are relevant to everyone working on how to strengthen tax administrations 
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This paper asks whether tax collection is manipulated in developing countries prior to elections. The point 
of departure is the literature on the Political Business Cycle (PBC), which claims that incumbent politicians 
implement expansionary policies prior to elections, in order to increase their chances of re-election 
(Nordhaus, 1975). Previous literature on the Political Business Cycle has mostly focused on the expendi-
ture side of the Political Business Cycle, demonstrating an increase in “voter-friendly” spending prior to 
elections, both on an aggregate level (Block, 2002; Block et al., 2003), but also when investigating more 
targeted spending such as on infrastructure (Drazen & Eslava, 2010), and wages and subsidies (Vergne, 
2009). 
A smaller strand of research has turned the attention to the other side of the equation, which is the reve-
nue-side. Acknowledging that paying less taxes also would be favourable to voters, researchers have tried 
to shed light on the role of taxation in the Political Business Cycle. However, findings here are more 
ambigious. One study, Block (2002) finds no relationship between taxation and elections. Another study 
finds evidence of policy manipulation only for indirect taxes, (Ehrhart, 2013), another study finds that this 
is highly dependent on the degree of competitiveness of the election (Prichard, 2016), a third study find 
no evidence on an aggregate level, but find that tax benefits are granted in order to target narrow interest 
groups (Khemani, 2004). What these previous studies have in common is that they focus on macro-level 
measurements of tax revenue, i.e. tax-to-GDP ratio1 
However, the main argument behind the political business cycle is that these policy manipulations are 
introduced in order to influence voters. Thus, voters should themselves experience the tax reduction, 
which macro level measurements are not able to capture. I argue that in order to fully investigate the 
existence of the Political Business Cycle, one must also take into account a micro level perspective, and 
investigate whether voters actually do experience changes in tax enforcement prior to elections. The aim 
of this paper is to investigate the following research question: Is tax collection reduced prior to elections in Sub-
Saharan Africa? In order to do so, I introduce a novel measurement based on survey data from Afroba-
rometer, and examines this question across 24 countries and 4 survey waves from Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
doing so, this paper contributes to the literature on the Political Business Cycle by turning (i) the attention 
towards tax collection as opposed to government spending, and (ii) focusing on the voter’s own experience 
of tax collection. 
Using taxation as an element of policy manipulation, and a way to win over voters, is problematic, not 
only from an economic perspective, but also in terms of political accountability more generally. Taxation 
is also a symbol of the linkages between the state and its society (Bräutigam et al., 2008). When citizens 
are taxed, they have an increased interest in paying attention to how the state spend its money, and an 
increased interest in deciding how the state spend the tax revenue (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980). Taxation 
is closely linked to state building (Bräutigam, 2008), and a large strand of research supports the claim that 
increased taxation is associated with several aspects related to higher levels of government quality and 
democracy (Altunbas & Thornton, 2011; Baskaran, 2014; Broms, 2015; Prichard et al., 2018). If govern-
ments use reduced tax enforcement in order to win votes in the short-term, it might also cause more 
                                                     
1 State-level tax revenue in the study by Khemani (2004), which only focuses on India. 
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severe problems in terms of government accountability in the long run. Strengthening the tax administra-
tions in Sub-Saharan Africa is a long-term goal, and major reforms are being implemented across the 
region. Despite these efforts, performance is still low when taking all these efforts into consideration 
(Moore, 2020). Thus, investigating underlying political dynamics that might influence tax collection will 
be of relevance also for policy makers working to increase tax revenue in the region. 
The paper proceeds as follows: First, the theoretical framework of the political business cycle is presented, 
along with earlier research of the taxation-side of the PBC in developing countries. Here, I also nuance 
the argument about tax enforcement as a part of the Political Business Cycle. Next, I present the data 
material thoroughly, followed by the analysis which investigates the effect of electoral proximity on tax 
collection. In sum, I do not find any evidence of the Political Business Cycle measured at the individual 
level, but some indication that this depends on the political climate that the incumbent operates in. 
 
Theory and Previous Research 
A large strand of literature suggests that incumbent politicians manipulate fiscal and monetary policies 
prior to elections, in order to increase their chance of being re-elected. Formally, this is known as the 
Political Business Cycle (PBC), a concept introduced by Nordhaus (1975). In an attempt to increase 
chances for re-election, governments implement expansionary fiscal or monetary politics in periods prior 
to elections, and compensate for the losses by implementing contractionary policies after the elections. 
This “opportunistic” approach to the Political Business Cycle was followed up by a more “partisan” ap-
proach advocated by Hibbs (1977), whose model predicts that, in an attempt to speak to the interest of 
their core voters, right-wing governments pursue policies that ensures low inflation (and risk higher un-
employment), whereas left-wing government aims for low unemployment (and are less concerned with 
the inflation rate). Subsequent empirical studies were mostly concerned with developed countries and 
democracies in particular, but development countries have received increased attention. And, as political 
parties in most developing countries do not follow the left-right scale with the attached ideological choices 
in fiscal and monetary policies, the opportunistic "Nordhaus model" is best suited to explain political 
business cycles in developing countries (Schuknecht, 2000), which is also in line with most studies on 
PBCs in developing countries. 
More recent literature introduced the concept of ‘conditional budget cycles’ (de Haan & Klomp, 2013) 
and found that political business cycles are in fact more prevalent in countries with low institutional quality 
(Shi & Svensson, 2006) and in new democracies (Brender & Drazen, 2005), which is often the situation 
in many developing countries. Adding to the studies by Shi and Svensson (2006) and Brender and Drazen 
(2005), Vergne (2009) uses panel data from 42 developing countries to demonstrate that the spending on 
visible expenditures, such as wages and subsidies, increases during election-years. Similarly, using panel 
data from 24 developing countries, Schuknecht (2000) finds that public expenditure increases prior to 
elections. Several case-studies also confirms the existence of PBC. Labonne (2016) studies municipal elec-
tions in the Phillippines, and finds a sharp increase in employment levels prior to elections, followed by a 
reduction in employment levels after the elections. Drazen and Eslava (2010) study Colombian municipal 
elections, and finds evidence for what they call “voter friendly spending”, i.e. that Colombian municipal-
ities increases spending on infrastructure, which is particularly important to voters, and reduces spending 
on areas that are of less importance for voters. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa has been largely ignored in this literature, with the notable exceptions of Block (2002) 
and Block et al. (2003), both studies examining the existence of political business cycles across several 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Block (2002) finds clear evidence of pre-election government manipula-
tion of both fiscal and monetary policies, and concludes that “political business cycles are alive and well 
in the developing world, and that nascent democracies are especially vulnerable” (p.205). This includes 
increased money supply during election years, reduction in nominal lending rates, mixed pre-election ef-
fect on inflation rate but increased inflation rate after the elections, increased spending on public goods 
during election year, and an increased fiscal deficit, all in order to gain the support of the rational voter. 
The lion’s part of the research on PBC in developing countries have focused on the expenditure side of 
the political business cycle, with less attention to the role of taxation (Prichard, 2016). Prichard (2016) 
argues that this “in part reflects greater ambiguity about the expected impact of elections on tax collection” 
(p.430): On the one hand, reduced tax collection might appeal to voters along the same line as increased 
government spending. On the other hand, reduced tax collection might be comparably less visible to most 
voters, and it might also be more costly for the government and - importantly - will imply reduced revenue 
and less room for increased government spending, particularly if the government already is limited in 
terms of running with fiscal deficits. 
Still, some notable cross-country findings confirm - with some caveats - the existence of PBCs with re-
gards to taxation in developing countries. Studying political budget cycles in developing countries using 
data from 98 developing countries over the period 1980-2010, Prichard (2016) finds that while elections 
in general have no effect on pre-election tax collection, competitive elections have a negative impact on pre-
election tax collection. The strongest effect is prior to elections that have been competitive, and where 
the incumbent lost the election. Using panel data from 56 developing countries during the period 
19802006, Ehrhart (2013) distinguishes between indirect and direct taxes, and finds that the former is 
decreased prior to elections, but no evidence of the same with regards to direct tax revenue. On the other 
hand, Block (2002), however finds no effect of elections (neither pre nor post election year) on tax revenue 
as share of GDP, using data exclusively on Africa. Finally, Khemani (2004) studies local level elections in 
India, and finds no evidence of a taxation-based political business cycle, but finds that there is a relation-
ship on the disaggregated level, as the incumbent manipulates tax policies to target specific interest groups. 
Reducing tax collection prior to elections is not easily done. Increased spending can to a certain extent be 
financed by loans, but reducing tax collection will automatically result in reduced income. In fact, Prichard 
(2016) suggests that one of the reasons the PBC literature has been somewhat silent on the role of tax 
collection, is because the role of tax collection is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, reduced tax 
collection will surely be popular among voters. On the other hand, it might not be visible to all voters, 
which is particularly the case in many developing countries, which usually rely on indirect taxes. Reduced 
tax collection might, generally, be implemented either through changes in tax policy, or through changes 
in enforcement. The fact that reducing tax collection is costly in terms of revenue loss, and that it might 
not be easily detected by an un-informed voter, might make it implausible that tax collection should be a 
part of the political business cycle. 
However, we can also think about tax regulations not only as regulations put in place in order to generate 
revenue for the government. Taxation is also a strong symbol of the relationship between the state and 
it’s citizens (Bräutigam et al., 2008), and tax collection is also a strong a symbol (sometimes even used as 
a proxy for) state capacity. However, more than anything, taxation is a strong symbol of the state’s power, 
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and paying taxes is more than anything the same as complying with the law. Drawing on what Holland 
(2016) calls forbereance, defined as “intentional and revocable government leniency toward violations of the 
law” (p. 233), being more lenient on tax regulations prior to elections might be a way of winning over 
voters. 
This forbereance requires “a bureaucracy with sufficient strength to execute politicians’ desires, but imperfect 
autonomy so that executives can intervene in enforcement” (Holland, 2016, p. 234). Numerous countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa have established Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities (SARA) (Fjeldstad & 
Moore, 2009) 2. However, these agencies are not free from political influence, and there are several exam-
ples of close connections between the political leadership and the leadership of tax administrations (Fjeld-
stad & Moore, 2009). 
The past two decades have also seen a considerably increase in the capacity and sophistication of the tax 
administrations in the region. Tax officials are more educated than ever before, and there is a higher degree 
of professional specialisation. In fact, tax administrations in Sub-Saharan Africa are now - on average - 
more efficient compared to tax administrations in other low-income regions. Still, there is a huge discrep-
ancy between the reforms undertaken to modernise the tax administrations and the amount of revenue 
that is collected, which in part is due to organisational challenges (Moore, 2020). Despite a considerable 
modernisation and digitalisation, Moore (2020) has found that a large part of the organisational capacity 
of staff at tax administrations across the regions is spent on trying to tax small-scale business owners, 
which requires face-to-face interaction and tax collectors who are “street smart and mobile” (p.9). The 
question is whether the combination of centralised tax administrations and the fact that a large part of tax 
collection from individuals still depend on face-to-face interactions, give room for the phenomenon of 
forbereance, where politicians knowingly reduce efforts to tax individuals prior to elections in order to in-
crease their chances of re-election. 
Research Question 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the following research question: Is tax collection reduced prior to elections 
in Sub-Saharan Africa? In sum, taxation is a strong symbol of state-society linkages. However, when mixed 
up with elections, arguably the strongest symbol of state-society linkages, the dynamics of taxation is un-
clear, and the findings are ambiguous. Drawing on literature on the Political Business Cycle, taxation 
should be reduced, as a part of expansionary fiscal policies. Thus, I hypothesise that elections will have a 
negative impact on the enforcement of tax regulations. In an attempt to win over voters, the incumbent 
government reduces the enforcement of tax regulation as elections are coming closer. 
 
                                                     
2 Revenue Authorities generally have more autonomy than other civil service agencies, but less autonomy than Central 
Banks, which is why they are referred to as "Semi-Autonomous" (Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 2011) 
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Data and Measurement 
The main source of data is from Afrobarometer (2016), a survey conducted across multiple African coun-
tries. This survey uses a standardized questionnaire which allows for cross-country comparisons. Nation-
ally representative samples are drawn using a clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample.3 
Thus, the data is nationally representative, but not representative for the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The dependent variable of interest is provided in round 3 through 6 of the survey. Furthermore, as the 
research design requires that more than one survey round is available, Gabon and Sao Tome & Principe 
are excluded from the sample, as they are only included in Round 6. The final sample consists of 70 
country-rounds: 10 from Round 3 (2005), 16 from Round 4 (2008), 23 from Round 5 (2011-2015) and 21 
from Round 6 (2016). 
Dependent Variable: Measuring Tax Enforcement 
Previous studies on the taxation-side of PBC have largely, if not solely, relied on total tax revenue as share 
of GDP as the operationalisation of their dependent variable. The measurement has been nuanced, such 
as by excluding natural resources (Prichard, 2016) and separating between direct and indirect tax collection 
(Ehrhart, 2013; Prichard, 2016). One important limitation with this operationalisation, as pointed out by 
Prichard (2016), is that it cannot distinguish between policy changes and changes in the enforcement of 
tax regulations. 
However, and more importantly, this measurement does not take into account the individual’s own expe-
rience (and/ or knowledge) regarding pre-election tax reductions. The whole rationale - from the incum-
bent government’s side - behind pre-election policy changes is to sway voters. It is not given that changes 
in total tax revenue (measured as share of GDP) will influence voters. This depends on the visibility of 
the taxes. If the aim is to overturn voters, it is crucial that the policy manipulations are in fact visible to 
the voters. To my knowledge, no-one has tried to capture the individual’s own experience of the enforce-
ment of tax regulations, in relation to elections. 
The outcome variable is the enforcement of tax regulation. The ideal operationalisation of tax regulation 
enforcement would be to ask individual about their perceived level of tax collection, but this does not exist 
for all of the survey rounds in the available data material. However, one survey question in Afrobrometer 
asks the respondents about their perceived level of corruption amongst tax officials: How many of the fol-
lowing people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Tax Officials (e.g. 
Ministry of Finance officials or Local Government tax collectors).4 The respondent can choose between the follow-
ing answers: None, Some of them, Most of them, All of them, and Don’t know/ have not heard enough. I propose to 
use the answer option of Don’t know/ have not heard enough to measure the level of enforcement of tax 
regulation. I suggest that respondents who answer Don’t know are less exposed to tax collectors compared 
to respondents who answer one of the other options. From this, I construct a binary outcome variable 
                                                     
3 More information about the survey methodology is available in section 5 of the Afrobarometer Round 7 Survey 
Manual and on https://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/sampling-principles.  
4 In Round 3, the question is slightly different as it gives the example of VATS/IRS officials instead of Ministry of Finance offi-
cials or Local Government tax collectors: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t 
you heard enough about them to say: Tax Officials (e.g. VATS/IRS officials). 
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that measures Non-enforcement, which takes the value 1 if the respondent answered Don’t know, and the 
value 0 if the respondent answered any of the other options (i.e. None, Some of them, Most of them, All of 
them). 
Thus, I assume that if proximity to elections have a positive effect on this variable measuring Non-Enforce-
ment, it implies more respondents answering Don’t know, i.e. less people are exposed to tax collectors, and 
that elections have a negative impact on tax collection. Thus, in line with the literature on the political 
business cycle, I hypothesise that electoral proximity has a positive effect on Non-Enforcement. 
Figure 1 below shows the distribution of the outcome variable. The histogram on the left-hand side shows 
the original variable, with the five different response-options for the original survey question. In the his-
togram on the right-hand side, the four first answers are collapsed into one variable measuring "Tax En-
forcement", whereas the option "Don’t know" in the histogram to the left is thought to measure "Non-
Enforcement", as presented in the histogram to the right. This dichotomous variable will be used for the 
analysis. The figures show that 14% of the sample has answered "Don’t know" to the question about 
perceived level of corruption among tax officials, which is roughly the same amount as "All of them", and 
slightly more than "None" with 9%. 
 




The validity of this measurement merits some further evaluation. Using self-reported measures as in the 
survey data, gives room for bias. Both corruption and taxation are sensitive issues, and the respondent 
might be unwilling to reveal true experiences. Thus, as this analysis relies on the "Don’t know" answer, it 
might be that I am simply measuring the unwillingness to reveal own attitudes towards corruption. Cor-
ruption being a sensitive issue, respondents might feel uncomfortable revealing their opinion on this sub-
ject. The risk for bias in answers to sensitive survey questions might be reduced by the fact that Afroba-
rometer is a survey not primarily about corruption or even political attitudes; The questionnaire includes 
around 100 questions on a wide range of topics, which reduces this risk. However, as much as half of the 
sample believes that the survey enumerator was sent by the president or a governmental agency, which is 
why I, in the analysis, I also run the regressions excluding these respondents. 
Comparison with level of knowledge of other political actors 
Afrobarometer also provides similarly phrased questions about corruption among the President, Parliament, 
Government Officials, as well as Local Government Councillors, and Figure 2 below shows the percentage 
who answers “Don’t know” to the these question, and we see that the highest percentage of "Don’t know" 
is for the president, followed by Tax Officials. "Local Government Councillors" have the lowest percentage 
of respondents answering "Don’t know". This could imply that people are more likely to have an opinion 
about the actors that they interact with, as presumably more people interact on a daily basis with local 
government councillors and government officials, compared to with the president. Thus, it seems that this 
variable captures some of the aspect of "presence", i.e. that individuals have more opinions about the actors 
that are close to them, which strengthens the case for the chosen dependent variable, i.e. using this variable 




FIGURE 2, PERCENTAGE "DON'T KNOW" FOR OTHER VARIABLES 
 
 
Predicting knowledge about tax requirements 
Another way to evaluate the validity of the dependent variable is to compare it with taxation variables 
from Afrobarometer Round 5, which is the round that contains the most detailed questions about tax 
payment, including questions about payment of various taxes. More specifically, it asks whether the re-
spondent are required to pay the tax, regardless of whether the respondent is able to pay or has paid. 
Moreover, Round 5 includes a question asking about how difficult it is to find out what taxes and fees 
one is supposed to pay to the government. Particularly the latter question should reflect enforcement 
rather than a strategic policy choice from the government; if it was reflecting a policy choice, people would 
still have information about tax payment, it would just be information about a different tax rate than 
before. Thus, I first check how well the "No Tax Enforcement" variable predicts knowledge about these 
taxes, and about how difficult it is to find information about tax requirements in general. The results, 
presented in Table 6 in the Appendix, shows that this can only predict lack of knowledge about VAT and 
employment tax. That is, answering "Don’t know" to the question about level of corruption amongst tax 
officials implies a reduced likelihood of having knowledge about the requirement to pay VAT, and to pay 
employment tax. I also model the same relationship using the categories of "President - don’t know" and 
"Government officials - don’t know" to estimate the probability of having knowledge about the same 
types of taxes, reported in Table 7 and Table 8 respectively. Here, we see that also answering "Don’t 
know" to the question regarding how corrupt the president is, signifies a reduced probability of having 
knowledge about requirement to pay employment tax. 
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Comparison with Tax-to-GDP ratio 
Finally, I also compare this with macro-level estimates of tax revenue from ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2020), 
prepared by Teorell et al. (2020). In Figure 3, the average level of "No Tax Enforcement" is plotted against 
various measurements of Tax-to-GDP ratio, for each year that correspond to a round in the survey.5All 
measurements are excluding taxation from natural resources, and I use both the measurement for total 
tax revenue, and investigate the relationship with more fine-grained data on taxes on goods and services, 
and income taxes respectively. Ideally, to strengthen the case for the use of this dependent variable "No 
Tax Enforcement", lower levels of "No Tax Enforcement" should correlate with higher levels of Tax-to-
GDP ratio. I.e., the more taxes a country collects, the more people are experiencing tax enforcement. 
Based on these figures, it does not seem to be such clear-cut relationship, perhaps with the exception of 
Namibia in the first figure, which has seen a small increase in the level of tax-to-GDP ratio, and a consid-
erable reduction in the average level of "No Tax Enforcement". However, one should be careful with 
comparing these individual-level experiences with macro-level measurements, as the taxes collected on an 
individual level are proportionally very small compared to what is collected on a central level, mostly from 
a small number of large companies (Moore, 2020). 
This proposed measurement - "No Tax Enforcement" based on a question regarding corruption amongst 
tax officials - is far from perfect. However, individual-level data on tax payments is notoriously difficult to 
obtain, particularly for large samples. Moreover, asking respondents directly about their tax payments is also 
not ideal, as this would imply asking respondents about their compliance with the law, which respondents 
might be reluctant to admit to in a survey (Kinsey, 1992). Attempting to capture knowledge about taxation 
instead, is a way to circumvent this problem, while at the same time staying closer to the theory, as the aim 
is to measure the experience of enforcement, not necessarily each individual’s own tax payment. 
 
                                                     
5 Some of the survey rounds are undertaken across different years, e.g. from December to January. In these cases, I use the 
Tax-to-GDP measurement from the year where the survey first started (i.e. for December in this case). 
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FIGURE 3, COMPARISON WITH MACRO TAX DATA 
 
 
Independent Variable: Electoral Proximity 
In order to measure electoral proximity, I follow Eifert et al. (2010) and measure this as the time between 
the respondent answered the Afrobarometer survey, and the earliest election in the respondent’s country. 6 
I follow Prichard (2016), and use the elections where the head of the state will be elected. 7Afrobarometer 
provides data on the exact date the survey was conducted for each respondent. Dates for the elections are 
                                                     
6 Eifert et al. (2010) investigates the effect of presidential elections on ethnic identification in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, using data from Afrobarometer rounds 1, 1.5, and 2. 
7 In Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland I use general elections. 
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mainly taken from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset (NELDA), which 
provides dates for elections up until 2015 (Hyde & Marinov, 2012, 2019). I gathered additional data on 
elections later than 2015. I thus calculate the number of days between the exact day the respondent answered 
the survey, and the nearest upcoming election. For ease of interpretation, I code electoral proximity as −1 · 
(days to nearest election), so that higher values (i.e. "less negative") signifies increased proximity to election. 
Figure 4 below shows the distribution of electoral proximity, which ranges from -2197 to -23, meaning that 
the closest a survey was conducted was as close as 23 days before an election. The earliest was as much as 
2030 days, i.e. around 5.5 years previous to an election. On average, the surveys were conducted 804 days, 
i.e. around 2.2 years previous to an election. Figure 5 shows the distribution of electoral proximity within 
each survey round. Due to this large variation in the independent variable, the independent variable is log-
transformed in the analysis. 
 









Previous literature, such as Prichard (2016) and Block et al. (2003) stress the importance of multiparty, 
competitive elections, for the workings of the political business cycle. Thus, in order to control for this, I 
include a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the incumbent lost the election, and the value 0 if this was 
not the case, using data from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset (NELDA) 
(Hyde & Marinov, 2012, 2019). As individual level control variables, I follow the literature on tax payment 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Ali et al. (2014), and add the following individual characteristics as control 
variables: Gender, age, job, level of education, urban/ rural, and wealth (index regarding the respondent’s 
ownership of tv, radio, and motor vehicle, this is the best and most widely used measurement of wealth 
from Afrobarometer), as well as political trust (index consisting of trust in president/ political leader, Par-
liament/ National Assembly, and Local Councillors). 
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Visualisation of the full data material 
Figure 6 visualises the data material at hand. The y-axis measures the mean value for the dependent vari-
able for each country, for each survey round. Years are measured along the y-axis, and the vertical lines 
represents election dates. There is substantial within-country variation in average levels of exposure to tax 
collection, which is visualised also in Figure 7, in relation to each country’s election. 
 












Firstly, descriptive statistics of the variables is presented in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
                     Mean SD Min Max N 
No Tax Enforcement   .1403562 .3473579 0 1 108018 
Proximity to election -804.3608 505.3522 -2030 -23 108075 
Proximity to election (ln) -6.40829 .8561886 -7.615791 -3.135494 108075 
Incumbent lost       .2159533 .4114849 0 1 71960 
Age                  36.40374 14.23001 18 130 107058 
Female               .5015036 .5000001 0 1 108075 
Education            3.184944 2.097059 0 9 107811 
Job                  1.408309 3.361319 -1 998 108075 
Wealth              .4129349 .3159406 0 1 107992 
Political Trust      2.694036 .9145473 1 4 106505 
 
Identification Strategy 
As previously mentioned, this study contributes to the literature on political business cycle by turning the 
attention to the individual taxpayers. This is reflected in the use of individual level survey data from Afroba-
rometer, which is a repeated cross-sectional survey (pseudo-panel). The survey does not follow the same 
individuals over time, but recruits a new populations sample for each survey round. The survey questions 
of interest remain the same across all survey rounds8 Thus, the data has been gathered from individuals 
across multiple countries and across multiple points in time. This allows me to compare levels of tax col-
lection in each country over time, sometimes measured close to an election, and other times measured more 
distant from an election, while the country’s baseline level of tax collection will be hold constant over time. 
As previously mentioned, only countries for which more than one survey round is available are included in 
the analysis, to allow for the inclusion of country fixed effects, that will control for country specific factors 
such as economic development, history, and regime type. There is considerable variation in the independent 
variable, where the earliest interview was conducted more than 3 years prior to an election, and the closest 
interview was conducted as close as 23 days prior to an election. The theoretical framework concerns the 
time prior to an election, suggesting that the effect of electoral proximity on tax exposure should be larger 
the closer to an election one gets. In other words, a hypothetical change from 2 years to 1.5 years should 
have a much smaller effect on tax exposure than a change from e.g. 6 weeks to 3 weeks, as the electoral 
campaigning is expected to intensify the closer to an election one gets. In order to capture this non-linear 
relationship between electoral proximity and tax exposure, I log-transform the electoral proximity variable. 
                                                     
8 With the exception of the small change in formulation, already mentioned in the data section. 
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The standard errors are clustered at the country-survey-round level (i.e. for each country-round) in order to 
control for the dependency of the independent variables for respondents in the same country and survey 
round. I also include a trend variable, taking the value 1 to 9 for each individual year represented in the data 
sample.9 Finally, a binary dependent variable speaks to a logit model. 
 
Results 
Firstly, bivariate regression models (presented in Table 5 in the Appendix) show no relationship between 
proximity to elections on tax enforcement when electoral proximity is measured in number of days. How-
ever, when log transformed, there is an unexpected negative relationship between electoral proximity and 
non-enforcement, indicating that the closer to an election, the more like an individual was of experiencing 
tax enforcement (i.e. less likely to experience non-enforcement). However, when adding the control varia-
bles as shown in model 1-4 in Table 2, this relationship is less robust. The relationship is not significant 
when controlling for electoral competitiveness in Model 1. Based on previous literature that stresses the 
importance of electoral competitiveness, most prominently Prichard (2016) and Block et al. (2003), I also 
test for an interaction effect between electoral proximity and electoral competitiveness in Model 2, which 
also does not show a significant relationship with non-enforcement. When adding the individual-level con-
trol variables in Model 3 however, we do see a significant impact on the interaction between electoral prox-
imity and competitiveness of the election on non-enforcement. In Figure 8, this interaction effect is visual-
ised, with the probability of non-enforcement measured on the Y-axis, and proximity to election on the X-
axis. Here, we see that for the elections where the incumbent government won (the blue line), electoral 
proximity is negatively associated with the probability of non-enforcement. In other words, when the in-
cumbent was popular, there was a higher level of tax collection prior to elections. However, for the elections 
when the incumbent lost, and presumably was unpopular, there is a very small but positive relationship 
between electoral proximity and non-enforcement, which is in line with the theory regarding the Political 
Business Cycle. However, these results are not particularly robust. Also, as previously mentioned, as much 
as half of the sample believed that the Afrobarometer survey was organised by the President or a govern-
mental agency. Thus, when re-running Model 3 and 4 from Table 2, results are show in Table 9 in the 
Appendix, this relationship is also not significant. 
As previously mentioned, Afrobarometer round 5 includes a range of relevant questions concerning tax 
payment. Thus, using the same control variables as specified above, I model the relationship between Elec-
toral Proximity and knowledge about the requirement to pay (i) VAT, (ii) government fee, (iii) property tax, 
(iv) income tax and (v) employment tax, as well as the (vi) perceived level of difficulty of finding out which 
taxes one is required to pay. The first five analyses do not support my hypothesis that there is a relationship 
between electoral proximity and tax enforcement, but I do find a very small and significant positive effect 
of electoral proximity and the perceived level of difficulty of finding out which taxes to find, as shown in 
Model 1 in Table 3. However, this is not significant when log-transforming Electoral Proximity (Model 2), 
nor when controlling for electoral competitiveness (Model 3), or testing for an interaction effect (Model 4). 
Controlling for electoral competitiveness reduces the sample size significantly (from 23 countries to 15 
                                                     
9 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. 
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countries), and when re-running Model 1 on the sample from Model 3, which is done in Model 5, there is 
no longer any effect of electoral proximity on tax enforcement. 
In sum, some of the analyses, notably Model 3 in Table 2 and Model 1 in Table 3, demonstrate some support 
for the hypothesis that voters experience reduced level of tax collection prior to elections. Importantly, this 
seems to depend on the incumbent’s political situation. However, these results are not particularly robust, 
and most of the evidence point towards no relationship between electoral proximity and tax collection. On 
the one hand, this is in fact in line with previous literature, such as Ehrhart (2013) and Prichard (2016) who 
found no clear-cut evidence of taxation as a part of the Political Business Cycle in developing countries. On 
the other hand, it is worth remembering that the measurement I use to capture Non-Enforcement is far 
from ideal, and similar analyses should be undertaken using more precise measurements of tax collection 
on an individual level. 
It might be that in the case of a Political Business Cycle, not all voters are actually supposed to benefit from 
reduced tax collection. As Holland (2015) argues, in the case of forbereance, it is only a specific group of voters 
who benefit from this “intentional leniency” towards law violations, i.e. the group of voters on which the 
incumbent depend on in order to win the election. Similarly - as previously mentioned - Khemani (2004) 
only found evidence of tax manipulations prior to an election on the disaggregate level, where tax manipu-
lations were used in order to target specific interest groups. Thus, it might be that my study is capturing a 
similar dynamic; there is no effect of elections on an aggregate level, but taxation might be manipulated only 
to favour certain group. One benefit measuring tax enforcement on the individual level is that it paves the 
way for further disaggregated studies that can nuance the literature on the political business cycle, and in-




TABLE 2, LOGISTIC REGRESSION: NON-ENFORCEMENT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Proximity to election (ln) -0.1139 -0.1679 -0.1898 * -0.1734 
     0.0829 0.0935 0.0939 0.0942 
Incumbent lost -0.0520 
   
     0.1628 
   
Incumbent lost 
 
0.8323 1.0763 * 0.8503 
     
 
0.4684 0.4548 0.4710 
Incumbent lost x Proximity to election (ln) 
 
0.1444 0.1953 ** 0.1508 * 
     
 
0.0746 0.0711 0.0745 
Age  
  
0.0087 *** 0.0095 *** 





0.3785 *** 0.3999 *** 





-0.1650 *** -0.1781 *** 











-0.6300 *** -0.6655 *** 











Constant -2.9720 *** -3.3314 *** -4.3509 *** -3.3955 *** 
     0.5462 0.6010 0.6335 0.6165 
Observations 71928 71928 70155 71061 
Adjusted  R2 
 
0.0497301 0.0915877 .0879384 
All models include country-level and survey-round FE, controlling for time trend, SE clustered on country-round-level.  





TABLE 3, OLS-REGRESSION: DIFFICULT TO FIND INFORMATION ABOUT TAXATION 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Proximity to election 0.0022 * 
   
0.0023 
     0.0008 
   
0.0023 
Age  -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 
     0.0006 0.0006 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
Female 0.0271 * 0.0272 * 0.0342 ** 0.0341 ** 0.0342 ** 
     0.0115 0.0115 0.0093 0.0093 0.0094 
Education -0.0394 *** -0.0395 *** -0.0385 *** -0.0385 *** -0.0386 *** 
     0.005 0.0051 0.0067 0.0068 0.0066 
Job  -0.0243 * -0.0242 * -0.0213 -0.0214 -0.0213 
     0.0092 0.0092 0.0117 0.0117 0.0118 
Wealth -0.1217 ** -0.1213 *** -0.1203 ** -0.1204 ** -0.1196 * 
     0.0322 0.0318 0.0391 0.0391 0.0402 
Proximity to election (ln) 
 
0.5743 0.107 0.4804 
 
     
 











   
-10.3812 
 
     
   
11.583 
 
Incumbent lost x Proximity to election (ln) 
   
-1.4792 
 
     
   
1.6879 
 
Constant 6.8268 *** 7.685 3.7019 6.2166 4.9208 * 
     1.2332 5.5442 5.6196 7.4737 1.953 
Observations 32427 32427 22112 22112 22112 
R2 0.0660748 0.0656495 0.0758711 0.0760017 0.0761337 
All models include country-level FE, SE clustered on country-round-level 








This paper set out to investigate the following research question: Is tax collection reduced prior to elections in Sub-
Saharan Africa?  The well-established theory regarding the Political Business Cycle argues that incumbent 
presidents manipulate macro level policies close to elections in order to win voters (Nordhaus, 1975). Most 
of the literature has focused on the spending-side of such expansionary policies, i.e. increased public spend-
ing to finance e.g. public goods or to increase employment, but attention has also been given towards the 
income-part of the equation, i.e. taxation, where it is argued that governments reduce tax rates prior to 
elections, which was the focus of this paper. Following on the footsteps of Ehrhart (2013) and particularly 
Prichard (2016), I set out to investigate this relationship on an individual level. If tax manipulations should 
have an effect on voters, they must also be visible to voters. However, using a novel measurement con-
structed based on data from Afrobarometer, I could find no apparent effect of proximity to elections on 
the enforcement of tax regulations. However, some results points in the direction that this might depend 
on the political climate in which the incumbent operate. Thus, more work should be done on nuance the 
role of competitive and multiparty elections. Moreover, it is worth examining whether these results differ 
between different groups of voters. At a time when strengthening tax administrations and increasing tax 
enforcement is on the top of the development agenda, more research should be done on examining also 
how taxation potentially could be a tool used by incumbent governments to gain political support. Under-
standing this dynamic is important in order to build tax administrations and tax policies that are not influ-
enced by short-term political goals, but rather contribute to increased public revenue as well as long term 
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Appendix 1: Sample 
TABLE 4, COUNTRIES AND SURVEY ROUNDS IN THE SAMPLE 
Country Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 
Benin x x x x 
Botswana x x x x 
Burkina Faso  x x  
Cameroon   x x 
Cote d’Ivoire   x x 
Ghana x x x x 
Guinea   x x 
Kenya x x x x 
Liberia  x x x 
Madagascar  x x  
Malawi  x x x 
Mali x x x x 
Mauritius   x x 
Mozambique  x x x 
Namibia x  x x 
Niger   x x 
Nigeria x x x x 
Senegal x x   
Sierra Leone   x x 
Tanzania  x x x 
Togo   x x 
Uganda x x x x 
Zambia x x x x 
Zimbabwe  x x x 
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Appendix 2: Bivariate Logistic Regression Models 
TABLE 5, BIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION: NON-ENFORCEMENT 
 (1) (2) 
     b/se b/se 
Proximity to election -0.0001 
 
     0.0001 
 
Proximity to election (ln) 
 
-0.0803* 
     
 
0.0409 
     
  
Constant -2.4504*** -2.8954*** 
     0.2357 0.3504 
Observations 108018 108018 
R2 .0609673 .0611673 
All models include country-level and survey round FE, SE clustered on country-round-level  




Appendix 3: Predicted Knowledge about Tax, Afrobarometer Round 5 
TABLE 6, TAX "DON’T KNOW" AS PREDICTOR (I.E. "NO TAX ENFORCEMENT") 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 




     b/se               b/se               b/se               b/se               b/se               b/se          
No Tax Enforcement   -0.2174*   -0.126 -0.1642 -0.0042   -0.2585*   0.04 
 
0.092 0.0953 0.0977 0.0781 0.115 0.0322 
Age   0.0018    0.0039**     0.0066***    0.0098***    0.0049*** -0.0009 
 
0.001 0.0014 0.0015 0.002 0.0014 0.0006 
Female -0.0113   -0.0850**  -0.0462 -0.0129 -0.0812 0.0144 
 
0.0266 0.0315 0.0365 0.0485 0.0465 0.0119 
Education    0.0880***    0.0847***    0.1082***    0.1296***    0.1019***   -0.0399*** 
 
0.0151 0.0146 0.0141 0.0235 0.0154 0.0056 
Job   0.0347    0.0527*   0.0475    0.0758**  -0.0031   -0.0242*   
 
0.0262 0.0266 0.028 0.0293 0.0268 0.009 
Political trust    0.1471***    0.1069***    0.0707*      0.1323**     0.1088*     -0.0619*** 
 
0.0408 0.0286 0.0338 0.0477 0.0447 0.0117 
Political Interest    0.0210*      0.0186*      0.0208**     0.0478***    0.0315***   -0.0101**  
 
0.0091 0.0082 0.008 0.0105 0.0084 0.0035 
Wealth    0.3423***    0.5841***    0.5388***    0.6272***    0.4894***   -0.1189*** 
 
0.0629 0.1073 0.1177 0.1498 0.086 0.031 
Constant   -0.8053***   -0.3524**    -0.5443***   -0.8767*** -0.0104    3.6821*** 
 
0.1407 0.1177 0.1036 0.184 0.1621 0.0344 
       
Observations 32844 33302 32276 13251 18061 32070 
Adjusted R2 0.1272146 0.1122327 0.1565585 0.11372 0.1177565                    
R2                                                                                                0.0706088 
All models include country-level FE, SE clustered on country-round-level 




TABLE 7, PRESIDENT "DON’T KNOW" AS PREDICTOR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 




     b/se               b/se               b/se               b/se               b/se               b/se          
President - Don't Know -0.0891 0.0027 0.0081 0.0892   -0.1991*   -0.0049 
 
0.0612 0.0723 0.077 0.0857 0.1015 0.0245 
Age   0.0017    0.0038**     0.0064***    0.0098***    0.0049*** -0.0008 
 
0.001 0.0014 0.0015 0.002 0.0014 0.0006 
Female -0.0136   -0.0867**  -0.0491 -0.013 -0.0806 0.015 
 
0.0265 0.0304 0.0357 0.0476 0.048 0.0119 
Education    0.0901***    0.0865***    0.1105***    0.1303***    0.1036***   -0.0403*** 
 
0.0154 0.0147 0.0145 0.0236 0.0154 0.0055 
Job   0.0355    0.0528*   0.0478    0.0761**  -0.0018   -0.0239*   
 
0.0261 0.0266 0.028 0.0294 0.0268 0.0091 
Political trust    0.1444***    0.1041*** 0.0676    0.1320**     0.1089*     -0.0610*** 
 
0.0412 0.0297 0.0348 0.0482 0.0443 0.0115 
Political Interest    0.0220*      0.0197*      0.0220**     0.0482***    0.0317***   -0.0104**  
 
0.0093 0.0085 0.0083 0.0104 0.0081 0.0035 
Wealth    0.3487***    0.5890***    0.5453***    0.6263***    0.4960***   -0.1207*** 
 
0.0626 0.1069 0.1184 0.1498 0.0859 0.0315 
Constant   -0.8215***   -0.3639**    -0.5589***   -0.8969*** -0.0304    3.6829*** 
 
0.1419 0.1167 0.1033 0.1797 0.1574 0.0345 
Observations 32856 33316 32289 13256 18068 32082 
Adjusted R2 0.1268308 0.1120414 0.1563144 0.1136066 0.1174598                    
R2                                                                                                0.0703953 
All models include country-level FE, SE clustered on country-round-level 




TABLE 8, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS "DON’T KNOW" AS PREDICTOR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 




     b/se               b/se               b/se               b/se               b/se               b/se          
Gov. officials - Don't Know -0.1224 -0.0038 -0.0059 -0.0758 -0.2388 0.0007 
 
0.0747 0.0971 0.0769 0.1192 0.1598 0.0276 
Age   0.0017    0.0038**     0.0064***    0.0100***    0.0048*** -0.0008 
 
0.001 0.0014 0.0016 0.002 0.0015 0.0006 
Female -0.0134   -0.0865**  -0.049 -0.0097 -0.0802 0.0149 
 
0.0267 0.0305 0.0358 0.048 0.0481 0.0118 
Education    0.0897***    0.0863***    0.1101***    0.1289***    0.1032***   -0.0404*** 
 
0.0154 0.0146 0.0144 0.0235 0.0155 0.0055 
Job   0.035    0.0527*   0.0476    0.0761**  -0.0039   -0.0240*   
 
0.0264 0.0265 0.028 0.0294 0.0273 0.0091 
Political trust    0.1450***    0.1041*** 0.0676    0.1363**     0.1095*     -0.0611*** 
 
0.0409 0.0292 0.0348 0.0469 0.0441 0.0118 
Political Interest    0.0220*      0.0197*      0.0221**     0.0474***    0.0317***   -0.0103**  
 
0.0091 0.0086 0.0084 0.0106 0.0083 0.0035 
Wealth    0.3479***    0.5898***    0.5457***    0.6276***    0.4966***   -0.1203*** 
 
0.0627 0.1065 0.1181 0.1508 0.0856 0.0316 
Constant   -0.8208***   -0.3623**    -0.5564***   -0.8775*** -0.027    3.6833*** 
 
0.1422 0.1182 0.103 0.1867 0.1577 0.0348 
Observations 32844 33302 32275 13248 18058 32069 
Adjusted R2 0.1267342 0.1118997 0.1561504 0.1138448 0.1173838                    
R2                                                                                                0.0703594 
All models include country-level FE, SE clustered on country-round-level 





Appendix 4: Excluding Those Who Thought the Government Sponsored 
the Survey 
 
TABLE 9, LOGIT MODELS, EXCLUDING RESPONDENTS WHO THOUGHT THE GOVERNMENT SPONSORED 
THE SURVEY 
 (1) (2) 
 
     b/se               b/se          
Proximity to election (ln) -0.0939 -0.0703 
 
0.0938 0.0928 
Incumbent lost    1.3852*   1.1024 
 
0.5966 0.5913 
Incumbent lost $times$ Proximity to election (ln)    0.2681**     0.2249*   
 
0.0982 0.0972 
Age     0.0074***    0.0078*** 
 
0.0022 0.0022 
Female    0.3512***    0.3498*** 
 
0.0511 0.0519 
Education   -0.1484***   -0.1611*** 
 
0.0166 0.0164 
Job  -0.0226 -0.0208 
 
0.0204 0.0195 
Wealth   -0.6061***   -0.6768*** 
 
0.1244 0.1335 
Political trust    0.2821***                    
 
0.0305                    
Constant   -3.7788***   -2.7106*** 
 
0.6 0.5691 
Observations 26033 26232 
Adjusted R2 0.0838099 0.0780577 
All models include country-level and survey-round FE, controlling for time trend, SE clustered on country-round-level 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
